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Foreword
SEESAC has a responsibility within its mandate to advise on border control measures and to provide support to
projects relating to the control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) within the South Eastern Europe region.
Discussions with a number or individuals and organisations led to the development of a hypothesis that ammunition
may be easier to detect than the weapons themselves at border crossing points and during ‘search and seize’
operations targeted against stockpiles. Yet these discussions also indicated that little formal open source research
had been conducted in this area; hence the commissioning of this study.
The research for the study was conducted by Threat Resolutions Limited (UK), who consulted widely with police,
customs, national security agencies, military units and other international organisations. The result is this study,
which supports the hypothesis that ammunition should, in theory, be easier to detect than the weapons themselves.
Yet it also identifies that further research is required in order to develop this hypothesis into a tactical doctrine for
the interdiction and location of concealed ammunition. There are obvious security implications in the publication of
some of the material identified during this study, and this information has therefore had to be omitted; but this
omission does not detract from the findings of the study. 
The next stage will be to conduct further research to develop and evaluate the tactical doctrine, and SEESAC will
endeavour to identify a donor and appropriate organisation to continue this work. SEESAC will therefore continue to
consult widely within the region in order to identify future requirements in this area, thereby continuing to contribute
to the reduction of illicit SALW movements. 
Belgrade, 30th September 2003 Adrian Wilkinson
Team Leader SEESAC
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Executive Summary
This study was commissioned by the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light
Weapons (SEESAC). The purpose of the Ammunition Detection Study is to determine if there is evidence to support
the SEESAC hypothesis that it may be more productive to specifically target the detection of ammunition for Small
Arms and Light Weapons rather than the weapons themselves. SEESAC is a developing organisation, with a
responsibility to identify information on the precise level of smuggling activity and also advise on measures to reduce
cross border trafficking; clearly current search methodologies used to detect weapons and ammunition within the
region are an important component of this advice. Following discussions with the SEESAC Team Leader a set of
assumptions, to support the Terms of Reference (TOR), were agreed.  
Initial desktop research examined weapons and ammunition design and manufacture to determine if and why
weapons can be more easily concealed than ammunition and what constituent parts are common or exclusive to one
particular commodity. Further analysis was conducted to determine if ammunition and weapons are consistently
transported together and examples of occurrences are provided. The investigation has involved visits to specialist
organisations and national security agencies that have undertaken to provide data on suitable search and detection
methodologies.  
Further research was also conducted to identify the benefits and limitations of a wide range of appropriate detection
technologies and equipments. Liaison with suppliers and users permitted direct comparisons of these equipments
in use, including some in operational situations.   
This report concludes that there is significant evidence to support the SEESAC hypothesis. However, the scope of the
investigation requires broadening before significant progress is to be made towards the implementation of effective
control measures. Any future scope should include:
 The conduct of an Operational Needs Analysis to accurately determine the level of threat, effectiveness of
current search methodologies and identify changes to these tactical methodologies that may be necessary to
improve the success rate in finding ammunition and weapons.
 The establishment of suitable criteria to determine the minimum detection thresholds at which ammunition
must be detected.
 The conduct of trials to determine if suitable scent patterns can be identified from which detection dogs can
be trained to consistently locate Small Arms Ammunition.
 The identification of the most suitable combination of tools to consistently detect ammunition and establish if
this will also provide an integrated solution.
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1 Introduction
In South Eastern Europe a significant problem exists in
controlling the proliferation of Small Arms and Light
Weapons (SALW) within partner nations and across
their respective borders. The ready availability of such
valuable commodities in large quantities has created a
thriving market for criminal gangs and smugglers alike.
For example it is estimated that in Albania alone
approximately 300,000 illicit SALW, from over
619,0001 looted from military stockpiles in 1997,
remain in circulation2. The resulting impact of their
existence presents a significant threat to peace,
security and stability in the region and their control has
been a key objective of the Stability Pact for South
Eastern Europe (SPSEE) since it’s formation in 19993
2 Background
A key area of responsibility within the SEESAC mandate
to the partner nations of the SPSEE (Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia4, Moldova,
Romania and Serbia & Montenegro) is to advise on
border control measures and implement projects
related to the control of SALW in the region. Within
SEESAC there is a growing consensus that it may be
more productive to specifically target the detection of
ammunition for SALW rather than the weapons
themselves. A number of reasons for this hypothesis
have been put forward, the principles of which are:
 Ammunition is more difficult to conceal than
weapons;
 If ammunition is detected, then it is likely that the
weapons will be located nearby;
 It may be technically less challenging to detect
concealed ammunition rather than concealed
weapons; and
 Specifically targeting the interdiction of ammunition
may force perpetrators to make greater concealment
efforts, thereby interrupting the tempo of illegal
operations.
Probably the most influential factors, that demonstrate
the ease with which these commodities can be moved
and that will have a significant impact on the nature of
control measures, are the length of physical ‘green’
borders across which smuggling can take place and
the availability of routes of entry that can be used.
Analysis of geographical and economic data for the
partner nations reveals the following statistics:5
 Land and sea borders around these countries extend
for approximately 4,800km.
 There are at least 38 registered working ports, of
which 12 are operated at inland waterways, located
throughout the region. In addition the natural,
geographical features offer a considerable number
of alternative unauthorised landing points.
 There are 473 known airports, of which 225 are
permanently paved and the remaining 248 are local
airstrips.
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1 Lt Col Paphadima Albania MoD
2 SEESAC Country Assessment, July 2003.
3 http://www.stabilitypact.org/stabilitypactgi/catalogue, May 2003.
4 Also known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM), but referred to as Macedonia in this  report.
5 CIA – The World Factbook 2003.
3 Aim
This aim of this report is to provide analysis, and
recommendations on the following:
 The SEESAC hypothesis.
 Tactical search methodologies for ammunition as
opposed to weapons.
 The effectiveness of Explosives Search Dogs in terms
of quantities and ranges at which packaged and
concealed ammunition and weapons can be
detected.
 Other technical systems for the detection of
packaged ammunition and weapons.  
 The advantages in terms of time, cost efficiency and
staff training and requirements of both approaches.
4 Methodology
The study has been conducted using the following
methodology:
 Initial desktop research.
 Consultation with national security agencies and
search training establishments.
 Analysis of data.
 The development of conclusions and
recommendations.
5 Assumptions
Since SEESAC has existed for only a short period of
time only limited information on the scale or known
modus operandi of factions and criminals involved in
cross-border trafficking has been acquired.6 The
following assumptions have, therefore, been made in
this report:
 SEESAC intends to recommend the development of
further control measures at large consignments of
illegal ammunition (and weapons, if an integrated
solution is equally effective) only.
 The use of all forms of transport, including road
vehicles, ships, barges and aircraft must be
considered.
 Given the extent of physical borders, their porosity
and the multiplicity of routes of entry, implementing
effective control measures will require the provision
of both static and mobile responses.
 Given the lack of financial resources within the
partner countries available budgetary and human
resources are likely to be extremely limited.  
6 SALW definition
The definition of SALW currently used by SEESAC is:
“All lethal conventional munitions that can be
carried by an individual combatant or a light
vehicle, that also do not require a substantial
logistic and maintenance capability”.
SEESAC acknowledges that there are a variety of
definitions for SALW circulating and international
consensus on a “correct” definition has yet to be
agreed7. For the purposes of this report the following
generic ammunition types have been included:  
 Small Arms Ammunition (SAA) and Cannon
ammunition up to 30mm.
 Mortars up to 100mm.
 Hand and Rifle Grenades.
 Anti-tank Weapons (including RPG-7 and derivatives)
 Man-Portable Surface to Air Missiles.
 Bulk explosives and accessories.
 Anti-Personnel and Anti-Tank mines.
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6 SEESAC has a mandate to consolidate information, but it is emphasised that it is not a criminal intelligence gathering organisation. That responsibility remains with EUROPOL,
INTERPOL, the SECI Centre for Combating Trans-Border Crime and national security authorities.
7 www.undp.org.yu/seesac Draft RMDS 02.10 - SALW Standards/ SALW definitions.
7 Analysis of the SEESAC 
hypothesis 
The opening statement of the SEESAC hypothesis is
that:
“Ammunition is more difficult to conceal than
weapons”.
Examination of the manufacturing process shows that,
as a general rule, most SALW are specifically designed
and manufactured to permit them to be dismantled for
ease of storage, carriage or cleaning8. The opposite,
however, is true of ammunition where the components
are normally permanently assembled during
manufacture, not least for reasons of safety but also to
maximise performance. There are exceptions to this
rule, such as bulk explosives, which can be broken
down into small quantities or the barrels of large
calibre mortars, which cannot be dismantled, but it is
strongly suggested that in most cases the statement is
true and SALW could more easily be broken down and
concealed than the related ammunition. 
The SEESAC hypothesis also suggests that:
“It may be technically easier to detect
concealed ammunition rather than concealed
weapons”.
In order to begin the assessment of whether concealed
SALW ammunition is easier to detect than the weapons
themselves it is first necessary to examine those
materials, which are common to, or differ, in the
finished products, which have been listed below:
 Weapons
 Metal, (most commonly steel, aluminium and
tinplate).
 Plastics
 Wood.
 Oil.
 Greases and preservatives.
 Ammunition, (including Bulk Explosives)
 Metal, (most commonly steel, aluminium,
tinplate, copper, lead and brass).
 Plastic.
 Wood.
 Oil.
 Greases and preservatives.
 Primary explosives, (commonly found in
detonators).
 Secondary explosives, (commonly found in
mortars, grenades, missiles, mines and
demolition stores). 
 Low explosives, (commonly found as
propellants in SAA). 
 Plasticisers, (used in some high explosives).
 Stabilisers, (commonly used in high and low
explosives).
It is evident from in the lists provided above that the
range of materials found in ammunition significantly
exceeds those in weapons. If the existence of suitable
search methodologies and tools can be identified, that
will detect these additional materials, then it logical to
conclude that concealed ammunition is more easily
detected than weapons.    
The SEESAC hypothesis also maintains that:
“If ammunition is detected, then it is likely
that the weapons will be nearby”.
There exists substantial documentary evidence to
demonstrate that weapons and ammunition are, in
most cases discovered together, especially where large
shipments have been seized;
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8 Hogg, I.V. “The Illustrated Encyclopaedia of Firearms”, Newnes Books, 2002, pp 11-16.
A further significant outcome of this evidence is that it
supports an integrated approach to detection if that
proves to be technically possible; such an approach
would offer the advantages of achieving the highest
probability of successful interdiction as well as being
the most cost efficient means of doing so.  
8 Principles of search12
8.1 General
The main purpose of search is to locate and confiscate
illegal goods or other forms of contraband, thus
restricting the possession, supply and movement of
such items. It is a straightforward process that requires
trained personnel to physically examine otherwise
normal environments or containers such as vehicles,
buildings or people, to detect secreted objects. Basic
search techniques do not, therefore, differ when
applied to ammunition as opposed to any other
commodity except that personnel will require specific
training in ammunition recognition and safe handling.
8.2 Definition
Search may be defined as:
“The application of systematic procedures
and appropriate detection equipment to
locate specified targets”. 
8.3 Systematic Search
It is important to ensure that techniques and
procedures are systematic for the following reasons:
 To minimise hazards associated with the
environment in which the search is being conducted,
for example working at height or in confined spaces,
where specialist safety equipment may be required.   
 To reduce the risk to search personnel posed by the
potential presence of measures designed to protect
the target assets being seized by security forces or
stolen by rival criminals. For example in November
2001, officers from the Hamilton Drug Squad in
Canada initiated a potentially deadly booby-trap
while searching an abandoned factory, where it was
suspected that drugs were being grown. Shortly after
entering the premises they were overcome by fits of
coughing and shortness of breath and had to make a
quick exit. A closer inspection revealed an unusual
contraption designed to fill the room with a fine mist
of isopropyl alcohol and various minute compounds.
The device, a paint spray gun, was triggered by a
motion detector. The drug growers had also rigged
the steel door leading to the target room, with wires
from the mains electrical supply, so that anyone who
pushed it from the outside would be electrocuted.
For added protection, they even placed open jars of
highly corrosive nitric acid in strategic locations and,
if spilled, the contents could have inflicted serious
burns13.  
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BOX 1: KFOR seizure, May 2002
In May 2002 a large quantity of weapons and
ammunition were seized in Kosovo when a truck
carrying timber and three cars accompanying it
were stopped near the town of Pec by KFOR
forces. Among the weapons seized were 52
rocket launchers, five anti-aircraft surface-to-air
missiles and a dozen anti-tank rocket launchers,
as well as assault rifles and ammunition.9
BOX 2: Columbian seizure, January 2001
In January 2001 the Colombian air force
intercepted a light plane from Venezuela, in
Colombian airspace that was carrying an illegal
shipment of weapons and ammunition.10
BOX 3: Illegal firearms trade
A report on the illegal trafficking of weapons
and ammunition throughout Europe during the
1990’s highlights over 40 major incidents, many
of which report ammunition being found with
weapons.11
9 http://Europaworld Kosovo “Major Weapons Seizure Thwarts Albanian Rebels”, 18 May 2002.
10 http://news.bbc.co.uk/world/americas, “Colombia Seizes Munitions Plane”, 31 January 2001.
11 http://web.ukonline.co.uk/p.mordecai/firearms, “Illegal Firearms Trade Across Europe”, January 2000.
12 International School for Search and Explosives Engineers – Search Training Module.
 To give the highest level of assurance that those
items being targeted have not been overlooked.    
 To ensure the provision and maintenance of accurate
search records in order to maintain the continuity of
evidence and to support the submission of that
evidence in subsequent legal proceedings.
8.4 Use of appropriate equipment
It is essential to ensure appropriate and accredited
equipment is employed for the following reasons:
 Failure to do so could jeopardise the safety of
security forces personnel and civilians. For example
the use of detection equipment that employs a
radioactive source must comply with International
Standards to prevent accidental exposure to
radiation.
 If the capabilities of the detection equipment are
unsuitable for the perceived threat they will be of
little value. For example a metal detector with a
range of only a few centimetres is of little use of the
target objects are buried at a greater depth.
8.5 Specified targets
Whatever search methodology is employed it is
essential that specified targets are clearly defined, in
order to maximise both the search resources available
and the probability of success. It is of little value to
stop and search many small vehicles when the desired
intention is to intercept large consignments of
weapons and ammunition, which could only be carried
in large vehicles. It must also be accepted that the use
of this tactic will sometimes allow the smuggling of
smaller shipments to proceed undetected.
9 Tactical search methodologies14
9.1 Defensive Search
Defensive search is usually conducted at static locatio-
ns, where there is a regular influx of people, vehicles or
cargo, such as permanent checkpoints at national
border crossings, seaports and airports. Within this form
of search two different tactical types of search may be
employed, the first of which is known as primary search.
The execution of this search is based on the continuous
observation of all human and vehicular traffic, during
which individuals or vehicles are selected at random for
closer scrutiny. It is, however, important that this
selection process is truly random, otherwise ineffective
trends may be inadvertently established and such errors
will quickly become apparent to those whose intention is
to identify and exploit weaknesses in the system. Where
the security situation demands random selection can
easily be replaced by full searching of all vehicles and
individuals, providing adequate resources are available
and the resultant reduction in traffic flow is acceptable.  
A critical element of this methodology is that it enables
search personnel to question people, thus providing the
opportunity to assess their general demeanour and
quickly analyse verbal responses.15 Where suspicions
are aroused search personnel have at their disposal a
further tactical option, i.e. they are able to decide that
a more thorough type of search, known as secondary
search, is required. In such circumstances, people and
vehicles can be segregated and moved to a specifically
designated area where a more intensive inspection can
be conducted. In some cases the decision to conduct a
secondary search may be prompted solely by ob-
servation, for example an apparently empty cargo
vehicle, which is riding unusually low on its suspension.
It is, however, important to ensure that the area where
this activity will be conducted is fit for purpose and
essential requirements include:
 A screened position, to deny observation by the
general public, of the procedures and equipment
being employed.
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13 Royal Canadian Mounted Police Criminal Intelligence Programme Report 2002.
14 International School for Search and Explosives Engineers – Search Training Module.
15 This can include the use of ‘profiling’. However this is beyond the scope of this study and will not be considered further.
 A dry environment in which vehicle contents can be
removed if necessary and where seized items can be
easily laid out, for the collection of forensic evidence
to be conducted, without them being exposed to
extreme climatic conditions.  
 Sufficient space in which several vehicles can be
held for examination. This allows the conduct of
concurrent search operations to be maintained at
the required level without causing unnecessary
disruption to the flow of traffic.
9.1.1 Advantages 
The main advantage of defensive search is the succes-
sful removal of illegal commodities from circulation.
Other, additional, advantages that may also ensue are:
 Disrupting illegal movement of illicit SALW.
 Deterring existing and potential perpetrators from
conducting further illegal activities, thus restricting
the availability of such goods and reducing the
harmful effects on security and stability within the
population.
 Forcing perpetrators to take increased risks in an
effort to avoid detection, which may cause them to
overexpose their activities and increase the chances
of interception by security forces.
9.1.2 Disadvantages
The main disadvantages of defensive search are as
follows:
 The conduct of physical searches may often be time-
consuming, particularly with large vehicles, ships or
boats. This can sometimes cause unacceptable
delays and disruption to commercial activities.  
 Where a consistently high level of activity is
necessary, or in extreme climatic conditions, search
personnel will only be capable of maintaining the
required level of concentration for limited periods of
time. To maintain effective results may require large
numbers of personnel to be employed, which will
impose an additional budgetary penalty.
 In countries with extensive borders the initial
advantage of deterrence may be negated if
perpetrators are able to circumvent established
checkpoints by using more isolated routes, which
cannot be easily monitored. 
9.2 Offensive Search
Offensive search is normally conducted without
warning and is often instigated as a result of specific,
targeted intelligence. Offensive search teams are
normally highly mobile, giving a greater degree of
flexibility in the range of locations to which they can be
deployed. This method of search is invariably used
against experienced criminals, who are adept at using
carefully prepared methods of short or long-term
concealment.  Success required the use of well-trained
personnel, sometimes using portable, specialist
equipment. In these circumstances additional security
personnel will usually be required to deploy in advance
to cordon and secure an area, building or vehicle prior
to the arrival of search assets. This is necessary to
prevent perpetrators escaping and to protect search
assets from potential attack whilst working.  
9.2.1 Advantages
The main advantage of offensive search operations, in
addition to those for defensive search, is:
 The element of surprise and the deployment of
highly skilled search assets greatly enhance the
chances of success.
Successful offensive search operations have the
potential to severely disrupt the tempo of illegal
activities. 
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BOX 4: Jamaica seizures, 2001 - 2002
In Jamaica, during the year 2001-2002 a series
of offensive search operations by police yielded
493 illegal weapons and a considerable
quantity of ammunition, a five-fold increase on
the previous year16. The same report also noted
that, during the same period, there had been a
significant reduction in gun-related murders. 
16 “Oneworld” News Report – 24 February 2003. 
The mobility of an offensive search capability can be
used to maximum effect since it can be directed into
remote areas that are being used by criminals to avoid
defensive searches at permanent points of entry.   
9.2.2 Disadvantages
The main disadvantages of offensive search are as
follows:
 If perpetrators are consistently thwarted, the
frequency and sophistication of protective measures
(possibly booby-traps) used to guard illegal assets, is
likely to intensify. This creates a corresponding risk
to the personal safety of search personnel. 
 The initial financial costs for training and equipment
are higher than those required for defensive search.  
9.3 Search training
9.3.1 Analysis
In order to determine precise search training
requirements for any theatre of operations it is first
necessary to conduct a detailed Operational Needs
Analysis (ONA), which consists of the following:
 A detailed threat assessment
 An analytical survey of existing search procedures, to
determine if they meet present and future threats,
including:18
 A training survey, which will determine if the
current training system is adequate for the
identified threat levels. This survey would
also identify appropriate revision of the
existing training programme 
 Identification of the attributes, qualifications
and experience necessary for personnel to
undertake training.
 An equipment survey, to determine if the
existing assets meet the search
requirements. 
9.3.2 Training Levels
As a general guide search training can be divided into
3 levels, as follows:
 Basic – A short introduction to search principles
intended for personnel who are not employed in
regular search operations but who are required to
be “Search Aware”. This training can be conducted
on site, with little disruption to the normal work
routine. The duration of training will depend on the
results of the ONA but can be as little as one days
training.
 Intermediate – A more detailed examination of
search principles with practical training in the
application of systematic search techniques and
use of basic equipment. This training would
normally be intended for personnel who regularly
conduct search operations in a low risk environment
(i.e. where there is a low risk of encountering an
improvised explosive device (IED)) as a function of
their normal duties, for example border guards. This
training can be conducted on site and, depending
on the results of the ONA, can be as little as five
days training.
 Advanced – Intensive theoretical and practical
training of dedicated search personnel, using
specialist equipment, who may be required to
operate in high risk environment (i.e. where there is
a high risk of encountering an IED), or where there
are known additional environmental safety hazards.
Again this training can be conducted on site and
again will depend on the results of the ONA, but
could be as little as five days training. It should be
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BOX 5: SFOR Offensive Search
During 2002 offensive search teams from the
Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
conducted many successful operations, during
which significant quantities of SALW weapons
and ammunition were recovered. In one
operation alone French troops seized 50 tonnes
of ammunition, which required 6 shipping
containers to remove it.17
17 http://www.nato.int/sfor/historic-moments/historic.htm 
18 One potential commercial organisation with this capability is the International School for Search and Explosives Engineers (ISSEE). SEESAC can advise on other potential suppliers.
noted, however, that this training can only be
undertaken by students who have previously
completed the intermediate training.  
9.4 Costs
The cost of training varies considerably as many
companies offer significant discounts, which are
dependant on a number of factors, such as level,
duration and number of students. As a general guide
search training at an accredited international
establishment is likely to cost between $300-500 per
student, per day. Costs of in-country training by a
specialist training team could be significantly less. The
provision of suitable search equipment depends
entirely on the size and role of the team and it is
therefore not possible to cost at this stage.
10 Detection dogs
10.1 General
Dogs have been used very successfully as a detection
tool for many years and today their extraordinary sense
of smell is used in a wide variety of roles, from
detecting buried earthquake victims to malignant
melanomas on hospital
patients.19 This report,
however, is specifically
interested in the ability of
trained detection dogs to
consistently locate illegal
weapons, explosives and ammunition. In order to
provide a comparison between detection dogs and
other machines used for the same purpose it is first
necessary to explain how a dog becomes such a
successful detection tool.   
10.2 Theory of scent20
Scent is created by the gaseous molecules of a
substance which, when combined with moisture and
air give off a vapour, or scent. These molecules are
carried in the air and can best be described as a gas or
smoke. As in the case of smoke scent can impregnate
other substances, similar to the way in which the
smoke from a bonfire will impregnate clothing. A scent
that is carried on air is known as “air scent” or
“windborne scent.” 
The sense of smell is one of the weakest human
senses and considerably poorer than that of a dog. As
humans evolved they became reliant on the sense of
sight, whereas the dog has retained its sense of smell
as its strongest sense.  
The mechanics of the human sense of smell are quite
simple. Scent molecules are drawn into the nostrils by
breathing in through the nose. These molecules come
into contact with a mucus membrane covering the
olfactory receptors, which are sited at the top and rear
of the nasal cavity. The molecules stick to the mucus
covering these receptors and pass this information via
nerves to the olfactory bulbs, situated at the bottom of
the brain. These bulbs decipher these scent codes and
establish what is being smelt. Humans are capable of
distinguishing as many as 10,000 different odours.  
The physical mechanics of the dog’s nose are very
different to humans, as the dog’s nose is designed to
be intensely efficient and extremely sensitive. In the
nostrils there are two openings, with flaps on the outer
sides, enabling maximum air intake. A septal organ
can, if required, initiate a sniffing processing at up to
300 times a minute. An excellent description what
constitutes a sniff is provided in the latest publication
from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD)21
“When a dog is sniffing, there is not just a
one-way flow of air into the nasal cavity. Each
sniff consists of five to seven small
inhalations and exhalations per second of
about 50 millilitres of air. The air blown out
has a high humidity and can gather molecules
outside the nose. Because the same air is
sucked back in again immediately, any odour
molecules that are released by increasing
humidity are likely to be drawn into the
nose”. 
In the nasal cavity there is a bony structure, called the
Submethoidal Shelf, which enables the dog to build up
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19 Williams H. and Permbroke A. “Sniffer Dogs in the Melanoma Clinic?” The Lancet, April 1989, p746. 
20 Provided by the Metropolitan Police Dog Training School – United Kingdom.
21 “Mine Detection Dog Training, Operations and Odour Detection”, GICHD, Geneva 2003, p17.
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more concentrated samples of scent. The air and
samples of scent are passed through a series of bony
channels called Terminate Scrolls. These scrolls
increase the speed at which the scent molecules strike
the thick mucus covering the olfactory receptors, which
are sited at the rear of the nasal cavity (the average
dog has around 220 million scent receptors in its nose
compared to around 5 million in the human nose).
Nerves from the receptors carry the scent through the
Cribiform Plate to the very large olfactory bulbs in the
dog’s brain. This highly honed piece of equipment that
the dog possesses enables diluted forms of scent to be
detected and the very large olfactory bulbs allows for
much greater scent memory than humans.  
10.3 Scent patterns
All solids and liquids emit a certain amount of vapour
and the pressure of the gas phase above them is called
“vapour pressure”. Its value corresponds to the
maximum pressure of the gas that exists above the
substance's surface. An appropriate example in the
context of ammunition is the space above some TNT
(Trinitrotoluene) contained in closed bottle, when
equilibrium has been reached (as many molecules
evaporate from the substance's surface as are
reabsorbed). The vapour pressure is therefore a very
important indicator of how easily a substance tends to
evaporate and of how likely detection of that vapour is
going to succeed.22
A critical element of detection dog training is to isolate
and identify the vapours, or scent pattern, of the target
substance to avoid inadvertently training the dog to
detect a contaminant from the environment in which
the substance exists, such as the packaging. This
requirement can be practically illustrated with detection
dogs employed in humanitarian demining operations in
Somaliland. There, dogs that have been trained to
detect the explosives in landmines, have given positive
indications on buried objects, which have subsequently
proved to be buried SAA containers.23 The most likely
explanation of these occurrences is that the containers
have been used to store or transport landmines and
have become contaminated with vapour from the
explosives in the landmines. It is, however, also
possible that the dogs are detecting a vapour left by the
original contents, i.e. the SAA, which closely matches
the vapours on which they were trained. It is stressed
that these indications have in no way detracted from
the performance of the dogs in the conduct of their
primary function. What this example also provides,
however, is evidence that if the scent pattern of the
packaging is stronger than the contents then that could
be used for training the dog in preference, or in
addition, to the scent pattern from the contents.     
The strength of a scent pattern will vary considerably
depending on many variables, which affect the
conditions in which the substance is found. They can
be increased by extremes of heat and decreased in
extremely cold conditions or after rainfall. Where a flow
of air is restricted by concealment so the scent pattern
will also diminish and it will become more difficult for
detection dogs to operate successfully. In the case of
buried substances the scent pattern will vary
depending on the soil type and the moisture and
nitrate content because the volatility of molecules in
the buried substance will be affected by these and
other conditions. 
10.4 Threshold limits
In order to maximise the capability of a detection dog it
is important to ensure that the dog understands
exactly what it is being asked to find. A dog can be
trained to ignore small quantities of substances or
objects in order to concentrate his attention on larger
amounts. To illustrate this requirement compare a
mine detection dog to one searching large vehicles at
a border checkpoint, where it is believed explosives
and ammunition are being smuggled in large
quantities. In the case of the mine detection dog it is
absolutely vital that the dog is trained to indicate on
the minute scent pattern of what may be a single anti-
personnel mine, as it is not acceptable for it to miss
one of these dangerous objects. Where a similar scent
pattern is found in a large vehicle it may simply be
because there is contamination within the vehicle from
previous smuggling activities, or only a very small
quantity is being carried. The time spent conducting a
thorough search of this vehicle could possibly have
been used more productively on a different vehicle with
a much larger scent pattern. If the dog has a high
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22 Claudio Bruschini, “Commercial Systems For The Direct Detection of Explosives, Final Report, February 2001 
23 Reported by Alan Sims, owner of Karenswood International Specialist Dog Training School, August 2003. 
threshold limit, there is a greater chance that when it
does indicate it means there is a stronger likelihood of
the presence of a large quantity of the target
substances. 
The potential problems, which must be considered
when attempting to determine such limits are as
follows:
 How to decide what constitutes a “large” amount of
weapons, ammunition or explosives.
 A dog trained to a very small threshold limit could be
indicating on a large consignment, which is very well
concealed and emits only a small scent pattern. 
 It is possible that a dog trained to a small threshold
limit may ignore a strong scent pattern since it
believes this is not what is has been trained to
locate.
10.5 Multi-scenting
The versatility of the detection dogs is further
demonstrated by the fact that they can be trained to
reliably detect a number of different substances. For
many years’ firearms and explosives search dogs,
employed by law enforcement agencies around the
world, have been trained to detect weapons and a wide
variety of explosives. In the USA for example it is
reported that a single Firearms and Explosives
detection dog can be trained on the oil from weapons
and 9 different high explosives.24 What is interesting to
note is that detection dogs do not appear to be
routinely trained on Small Arms Ammunition (SAA). This
may be because there are a great many different
manufacturers worldwide and it may be that there are
too many scent patterns on which to effectively train
the dog. It is, therefore possible that if SAA were being
moved separately from weapons the chances of
successful interdiction would be very low. If it is can be
established that the bulk of these supplies come from
a small number of manufacturers it should be possible
to isolate these scent patterns and add them to the
dog’s training.   
10.6 Detection ranges
A specific requirement of the SEESAC Ammunition
Detection Study TOR is to report on the ranges at which
detection dogs can locate concealed ammunition.
Because of the many variables detailed above, which
can affect the production and diffusion of vapours,
accurate data on precise detection ranges is not
available. This is illustrated by experiments in which
detection dogs were used to determine the range at
which landmines containing TNT (Trinitrotoluene) could
be detected. An hour after a mine was laid it could be
detected at a range of approximately 1 metre but after
a month the mine could be detected from as far away
as 30 metres, depending on the prevailing
conditions.25 What is significant in terms of the
SEESAC application is that trained detection dogs are
capable of indicating the presence of buried
ammunition at considerable distances and, providing
they are correctly trained to focus on the source of that
indication, can pinpoint the location of that
ammunition. There is also considerable, scientific
evidence to support a proposal that detection dogs
offer a better opportunity of success for locating many
other types of concealed ammunition and explosives,
compared to machines used for the same purpose, the
key point of which is as follows:
“Dogs can be trained to detect odours at
vapour pressures well below the detection
capability of currently existing chemical
detection devices.” 26
10.7 Other research
There is considerable, additional evidence that dogs
have been successfully trained to detect specific types
of ammunition, in projects conducted within several
European countries. The classified nature of this
evidence prevents its inclusion in this report but liaison
between interested parties can be conducted by
SEESAC. 
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24 ROUHI A.M. “Detecting Illegal Substances” Chemical and Engineering News, 29 September 1997.
25 “Mine Detection Dog Training, Operations and Odour Detection”, GICHD, Geneva 2003, p 169.
26 “Mine Detection Dog Training, Operations and Odour Detection”, GICHD, Geneva 2003, p 16.
10.8 Benefits
The benefits of using
detections dogs are as
follows:
 They can detect and
pinpoint the precise
location of concealed
ammunition and weapons.
 They are robust, agile and possess exceptional
stamina, so can operate for long periods of time with
only short breaks and in restricted spaces
inaccessible to humans.
 Their operating speed significantly exceeds what can
be achieved by physical search. 
10.9 Limitations
The limitations of detections dogs are as follows:
 They will only find what they have been trained to
find.
 Their effectiveness is highly dependent on the ability
of the dog handler.
 They are susceptible to injury and illness.
 Associated veterinary treatment or a replacement
dog in cases of serious injury) can incur significant
financial penalty. 
10.10 Costs
Without a detailed breakdown of precise training
requirements it is difficult to accurately cost the
training of detection dogs (and handlers). As a guide it
is likely that the training of a “standard” Firearms and
Explosives Detection Dog team would cost in the order
of $19,000 - $29,000, (excluding the handler’s salary).  
11 Detection equipment
11.1 General
An immense range of detection equipment is currently
available on the commercial market, which ranges in
cost from only a few thousand to several million
dollars. It is therefore intended to provide examples of
each type of equipment with a short explanation of
how they work and their practical application. Since a
comparison of individual models within an equipment
type is not within the scope of this report comments on
performance have been restricted to known benefits or
limitations that are associated with each of the
technologies, the majority of which have been collated
by gathering anecdotal evidence from operational
users.  
Common to all detection equipment is the possibility of
incorrect readings or indications.  Within the industry
two terms are generally used to describe these
occurrences, as follows:
 A “False Positive” occurs when equipment indicates
that a target object or substance has been detected
or observed but, after subsequent investigation, that
object or substance proves to be innocuous.
 A “False Negative” occurs when detection
equipment fails to detect the target object or
substance for which it is designed, but, after
subsequent investigation, that object or substance is
found to be present. 
11.2 Induction coil metal detectors27
These detectors operate by using a metallic 'search'
coil, sometimes called a search 'loop' which locates
metallic objects. An electric alternating current is
passed from the metal
detector's battery through
the search coil. This current
induces an alternating
electromagnetic field around
the search coil. This field is
uniform and looks similar to the field which iron filings
pick out around a bar magnet. However, the field is
easily distorted by a metallic object, for example a coin,
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27 http://www.sciencenet.org.uk/articles, “Metal Detectors”, 27 July 2003.
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or an object that is magnetised, such as a nail or
naturally magnetic mineral like magnetite. A conducting
metallic object produces an electromagnetic field,
which opposes the induced electromagnetic field of the
search coil. The opposing electromagnetic fields are
produced by eddy currents within these objects. When
the uniform electromagnetic field of the search coil
passes over a metallic object with an eddy current, the
detector's field is weakened and distorted. The opposite
happens with a magnetic object in an alternating
electromagnetic field (the field produced by a metal
detector) the object causes the field to be strengthened
and distorted. 
All induction coil detectors have an audible note
produced by the mixing of two oscillators. One
oscillator produces a 'reference' frequency which is
very similar to that produced by another oscillator
circuit within the search coil. The search coil frequency
is dependent on the distortion of the electromagnetic
field it produces, i.e. the materials it passes over
buried in the ground. When a search loop is passed
over a conducting metallic object, the detector's
electromagnetic field is weakened – this raises the
frequency within the search coil oscillator, making an
audible difference. When a magnetic material enters
the field of the detector and concentrates it, a lower
frequency is produced in the search coil oscillator,
resulting in an opposite audible beat.
11.2.1 Benefits
Induction coil detectors are commonly used by low-
level security forces’ search teams to conduct routine
searches and have the following benefits:
 Easy to prepare and use.
 Cheap to procure.
 Lightweight, (man-portable).
 Robust.
 Easily maintained.
 They require less than 1 days training to become a
competent operator.
11.2.2 Limitations
The limitations associated with induction coil detectors
are as follows:
 The detection range is limited and can vary
significantly from the performance specifications
claimed by manufacturers. In general terms all fall
within the range of approximately 10 cm for small
metallic objects, for example anti-personnel mines,
to approximately 30cm for anti-tank mines and
depths of up to approximately 1m for larger metallic
objects. However, an independent study of the
performance of 29 commercial detectors carried out
by the International Pilot Project for Technology
Cooperation28 in 2000, should serve as a useful
guide
 They cannot differentiate between metallic objects,
which may be ammunition or weapons, and
innocuous items. Therefore, where they are used in
an environment of high metal contamination, they
will give a greater number of false positive readings
which must be subjected to further investigation,
normally using physical search or digging.
 Not capable of detecting bulk explosives packaged in
non-metallic containers.
 They are only effective in substances of a light
density, such as soil or sand.
11.2.3 Cost
The cost of metal detectors ranges from $1,000 -
$5,000 each, but considerable discounts can be
obtained for multiple purchases.
11.3 Magnetometers29
Magnetometers are the most sensitive version of
ferrous metal detectors and are particularly useful for
finding large metal objects below ground buried at
depths up to 6m.  They differ from induction coil
detectors in that they detect anomalies, in the
naturally occurring magnetic field within the earth,
caused by ferromagnetic objects. Audible warning
and/or visual signals are also provided and most
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29 “Metal Detectors Catalogue 2003”, GICHD, Geneva, February 2003.
magnetometers have a stepping switch and visual
display the combined use of which allows the
sensitivity to be adjusted and visually monitored. This
enables the user to more easily differentiate the depth,
size and orientation of the object. Although more
commonly used for locating Unexploded Ordnance
(UXO) these detectors can also be effectively used to
locate buried ammunition and weapons in hides.      
11.3.1 Benefits
The benefits of using magnetometers are as follows:
 Easy to prepare and use.
 Lightweight (man–portable).
 Increased detection ranges over induction coil
detectors. For example a hand grenade can be
detected at a range of approximately 50cm and an
anti-tank mine at ranges of up to approximately 2m.
Much larger objects, such as aircraft bombs can be
detected at ranges up to 8m, depending on the type.
This extended detection range means that they are
useful for detecting ammunition or weapons. 
 After only one or two days training an operator can
easily become proficient in determining the size and
depth of metallic objects, which allows some
readings to be discounted and thus reduces the
amount of time required for subsequent physical
search  
11.3.2 Limitations
The limitations of using magnetometers are as follows:
 Magnetometers are generally less robust than
induction coil detectors and most require regular
calibration, although there is one notable exception,
the Foerster FEREX 4.032, which carries a lifetime
probe guarantee.
 As with other metal detectors magnetometers cannot
differentiate between metallic objects, which may be
ammunition or weapons and innocuous items
therefore positive readings must be subjected to
further investigation by physical search or digging.
 They are not capable of detecting bulk explosives
packaged in non-metallic containers.   
11.3.3 Cost
The cost of a single magnetometer ranges from $4,000
– 8,000 but considerable discounts can be obtained
for multiple purchases.
11.4 Trace explosive detection30
In trace detection explosive is detected by chemical
identification of microscopic residues of the explosive
compound. These residues can be in either of two
forms, vapour or particulate. Vapour, as described
earlier in this report is the gas-phase molecules that
are emitted from a solid or liquid explosive, depending
on its vapour pressure.
Particulate contamination
refers to microscopic
particles of solid material,
which adhere to surfaces
that have, directly or
indirectly, come into
contact with an explosive
material. Particulate
contamination is usually
sampled by wiping the surface to be screened with a
swipe pad, provided by the manufacturer of the
detection system being used. The pad is then inserted
into a sampling port on the instrument and within a few
seconds it can be analysed for the presence of
explosives. Particulate detection is particularly useful
for explosives such as RDX
(cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine or Research Developed
Explosive) and PETN (pentaerythritol tetranitrate),
which have very low vapour pressures.
The most widely used technique within the field of
trace detection is Ion Mobility Spectrometry.31 The
method of operation is that air is drawn into the
instrument and ionised, by being passed through a
chamber which contains a piece of metal coated with a
radioactive substance to form positive or negative ions,
in the case of explosives it is negative ions that are
formed. Ions pass through an electronic shutter gate
and are subjected to an electric field in a tube to
measure the transit or “drift time” of the ions. This
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transit time is then measured against stored transit
times of known compounds making it possible to
distinguish the target material.  
11.4.1 Benefits
The benefits of using IMS instruments are as follows:
 Easy to prepare and use.
 Portable machines are available, which can be
carried in the boot of a large saloon vehicle or small
cargo vehicle.
 Short analysis response times mean that a high
throughput of people of vehicles through a
checkpoint can be achieved.
 Can detect smokeless propellant from SAA as well as
a range of high explosives.32
11.4.2 Limitations
The limitations of using IMS instruments are as
follows:
 Variable threshold limits cannot be programmed into
IMS instruments. This means that in an environment
of relatively minor explosive contamination, such as
a vehicle previously used to carry explosives, they
will give a false positive indication.
 Whilst they do not present a health risk the use of
radioactive source equipment may require legislative
approval before use and regulatory oversight once
operational.
 Most IMS systems require the use of mains
electricity, therefore their use in field operations is
either restricted to less efficient, hand-held
equipments or they must be supported by a suitable
generator.
 IMS equipments are not as sensitive as detection
dogs and normally would not be able to follow an
indication to its source. For example in the rear of
vehicle where ammunition or explosives are hidden
the IMS equipment will alarm but a suitably trained
dog should be able to isolate the source of the scent,
thus reducing the time required for subsequent
physical search.  
 Changes in atmospheric pressure caused either by
climatic conditions or using the equipment at an
elevation of more than approximately 100m may
necessitate recalibration of the equipment, which
can be conducted by the user.
11.4.3 Costs
The costs range from approximately $5,000 for a hand-
held detector to $300,000 for a human portal
equipment. Vehicle screening portals can be obtained
but are likely to cost significantly more than the human
portal and quotes could not be obtained at this stage.  
11.5 Vapour odour detection system
(VODS)
VODS is a UK commercial variant of the Mechem
Explosive and Drug Detection System (MEDDS), which
was developed in South Africa in 1985 to trace
smuggled explosives and ammunition.33 The
technique used entails the screening of drawn scent
samples from sealed or enclosed environments such
as sea containers, vehicles, or
packing cases. By use of a mobile
pump, air is drawn through a
vacuum line, over a special filter,
which is designed to absorb
maximum scent for pre-selected
specific substances, such as explosives or
ammunition. Samples are then taken to a controlled
environment where a detection dog (with its handler) is
used to determine if traces of explosive have been
found on the filters. If a positive indication is observed
a second detection dog is used for confirmation.
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32 Provided in manufacturers’ brochure.
33 “Mine Detection Dog Training, Operations and Odour Detection”, GICHD, Geneva 2003, p165.
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11.5.1 Benefits
The benefits of using the VODS are as follows:
 A very high throughput of traffic can be achieved. In
addition it is possible to conduct the analysis away
from view of the general public thus maintaining the
secrecy of how the system works.
 The system is ideal for use in countries where for
cultural or religious reasons the use of detection
dogs in close proximity to humans is unacceptable.
 The dogs work in a comfortable, controlled
environment where there is little risk of injury.  
 The system is self-validating as the dogs can be
tested with control samples at any time whilst they
are working.
 The system is easily portable and can, therefore, be
utilised in multiple locations. In addition it can be
used in environments where dogs cannot normally
work, such as a stack of large containers at a port,
where samples can be drawn using a portable
platform. 
11.5.2 Limitations
As with all trace detection systems the possibility of
detecting residual contamination is always possible.
The system is a method of screening and must be
supported by a physical search capability. There is also
an obvious lapse time between obtaining the samples
and presenting to the dog.
11.5.3 Cost
The cost will vary depending on the anticipated supply
level of filters and storage tubes and the precise
training requirements for the dogs and handlers but as
a guide can be estimated at approximately $76,000,
subdivided as follows:
 Technical equipment and spares
$42,000.
 3 dogs (includes 1 reserve)
$29,000.
 Training of handler
$5,000 (Excluding salary and subsistence).
11.6 X-Ray34
X-ray equipments have been
in use as screening
equipment for many years
and a wide range of machines
are now available that can
examine items as small as a
letter to the biggest heavy good vehicle.  
All X-ray based systems involve irradiation of a target
item, usually followed by detection of an image created
by X-rays that are either transmitted or backscattered
by the item. Fluoroscopic imaging refers to a
transmission x-ray system where the transmitted x-rays
form an image of the objects onto a fluorescent screen.
This is the simplest type of system, exposing the entire
object with a cone of x-ray energy, often for extended
periods. The fluorescent screen is normally used in real
time using a 45° mirror (built into the machine to avoid
standing in direct line with the x-rays).
Standard transmission x-ray systems use a fan or
flying-spot of x-rays to scan the object as it is carried
past the scanner by a conveyor belt. A black and white
image is produced directly, with a linear array of
sensing diodes. The resulting image is stored in digital
memory and displayed on a TV or computer screen for
operator viewing.  
Backscatter systems produce an image from x-rays
that is scattered from the screened object. They will
measure the effective atomic number (Z) of the
screened item and will automatically alarm in the
presence of materials that have an effective Z in the
correct range for explosives. The backscatter system
produces two images and both the backscatter and
transmission images are displayed. Because low-Z
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materials are more efficient at scattering x-rays,
explosive-like materials are imaged as bright in the
backscatter image, while they are barely visible in the
transmitted image. Whilst the backscatter image is
usually most effective for the detection of explosives
the transmitted image is still useful for viewing metal
items. One problem with backscatter machines is that
they cannot discriminate between similar low-Z
materials, for example military plastic explosive and
other, innocuous plastic items. 
Dual-energy x-ray systems yield superior material
discrimination through comparison of the attenuation
of x-ray beams at two energies. Materials of specific Z
numbers (the same effective Z as explosives) can be
clearly highlighted for the operator by adding colour to
the image. A material that has a high Z number
(metals) is often coloured green, while low-Z materials
are coloured orange and materials with the same Z as
explosives are red. Like backscatter machines dual-
energy systems can also have an automated alarm
system fitted.
11.6.1 Benefits
The benefits of using x-ray systems are as follows:
 A high throughput of human and vehicular traffic can
be achieved. Truly random selection of targets for
inspection can also add a considerable tactical
advantage through the element of surprise or offer
the added benefit of deterrence.
 X-ray systems can be extremely effective when used
by experienced operators.
 They can be used to detect ammunition, explosives
and weapons.
 Vehicle mounted versions, including the largest
vehicle scanners, are available and can, therefore,
be utilised in multiple locations. Again, where truly
random selection is used, surprise and deterrence
are added benefits.  
11.6.2 Limitations
 Whilst initial training may take only a few days it may
require several months practice with specialist
supervision to produce a competent operator. 
 Whilst they do not present a health risk the use of
radioactive source equipment may require legislative
approval and regulatory oversight once operational.
 All x-ray systems must be supported by a physical
search capability.
 Where staff are required to work at high levels of
attention to monitors or screens, adequate
concentration can rarely be maintained for longer
than 20 minutes35. To maintain effective results may
require large numbers of personnel to be employed
or the purchase of an electronic audit system such
as the Threat Image Projection System (TIPS)36,
which will impose a significant budgetary penalty.
11.6.3 Cost
The cost of equipment varies from approximately
$70,000 for a machine used to screen large packages
to over $3,000,000 for a machine used to screen
heavy good vehicles.
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35 Groves, M. “An Overview of Detection Technology in UK”, Presentation Paper to Explosives-World Conference, April 2003.
36 A commercial software package the purpose of which is its purpose is to monitor the x-ray operator’s performance level by discretely projecting images of threats into bags
being scanned by the x-ray. 
11.7 Surface penetrating radar (SPR)37
SPR works by generating pulses of electromagnetic
energy and launching them directly into the surface to
be investigated. The radar measures the time it takes
for this pulse of energy to travel to the target and back
to the antenna. A transmitter-receiver interfaces the
antenna system to the user controller and processes
the basic pulse information in order to improve the
clarity of the radar signal and the resultant image, both
of which are of extreme importance. The operator
views the results in real-time through a controller
unit.38 Both concealed metallic and non-metallic
objects can be located.
11.7.1 Benefits
The benefits of using SPR are as follows:
 It can be used to detect hidden or buried weapons,
ammunition and explosives in deep hides, especially
under concrete floors and in walls.
 It can be operated on batteries for use in field
operations.
 It is man-portable.
11.7.2 Limitations
The limitations of using SPR are as follows:
 Its use is specialised but limited.
 Whilst initial training may take only a few days it may
require several months practice with specialist
supervision to produce a competent operator. 
 When used in soils that have a high percentage of
dissolved salts or wet clay depth of penetration and
resolution of the images can be significantly
degraded. 
11.7.3 Cost
The cost of a single SPR is approximately $40,000 –
$48,000.
12 The human factor39
Irrespective of how advanced technology may be the
use of all detection equipments will at some stage
require a human input. The high levels of attention
required for working with monitors and screens, shown
above, is an excellent example and the requirement for
similar levels of concentration can be applied to all
associated disciplines. Most literature on human
resources management contains agrees that “the
workforce is the most vital asset” or “it is people
that make the difference” and such statements are
well accepted and understood.40 Therefore, in order to
maximise the success of any control measure that is to
be implemented, it is strongly suggested that close
17
SALW Ammunition Detection Study
(2003-09-30)
37 Also often referred to as Ground Penetrating radar (GPR).
38 Provided in manufacturer’s brochure.
39 Groves, M. “An Overview of Detection Technology in UK”, Presentation Paper to Explosives-World Conference, April 2003.
40 Storey, J. and Sisson, K. “Managing Human Resources and Industrial Relations”, Open University Press, 1996, p1.
41 An individuals’ competence to successfully and safely complete a task is determined by their operational experience, education and training. Experience alone does not
necessarily equate to competence!
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attention is paid to those aspects of human resources
management41 detailed below. It is stressed, however,
that this list is offered as a guide and is not exhaustive:
 Qualifications.
 Selection.
 Initial training.
 Supervision.
 Audit.
 Continuation training and education.
 Personal development (especially through membership
of an accredited professional body.
Similar attention must also be paid to the employment
of dog handlers in this field, where there may be a
misconception that the only required attribute is a love
of dogs. Whilst this is clearly an important factor there
are a significant amount of complex scientific
knowledge, related to ammunition and explosives and
animal behaviour, which a handler must be able to
assimilate during his/her training. 
13 Operational analysis
The evidence presented shows that the most effective
resources, to detect SALW and ammunition, are likely
to be a combination of physical search and detection
dogs. A comparative analysis of the rate at which each
can operate, based on anecdotal evidence from
operational units is tabulated below. It is accepted that
these rates are subject to a considerable number of
variables, but they are only intended to be indicative: 
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Open Ground Standard Shipping Container42 43 Heavy Goods Vehicle Trailer Unit
(100m2) (38m3) (117m3)
Search Team44 40 150 min 180 min 480 min
(magnetometers) (hand held explosive detectors) (hand-held explosive detectors)
Detection Dog 15-20 min 5-10 min 15-45 min
VODS N/A 15 - 20 min 20 -25 min 
(including analysis of samples) (including analysis of samples)
42 May also be considered as a room in a building.
43 VODS may be required where high volume of sealed containers are present, e.g. at ports.  
44 Search team of 2 pairs of searchers
BOX 6:
Comparisons
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14 Conclusions
There is a considerable amount of evidence to support
the SEESAC hypothesis, as follows:
 The design and manufacture of ammunition makes it
more difficult to conceal than weapons.
 The range of materials used in the manufacture of
ammunition significantly exceeds those used in
weapons. Since a wide variety of tools and
equipments are available to detect these materials,
especially explosives, it is highly likely that SALW
ammunition will be technically less challenging to
detect than the weapons. 
 There is a wealth of evidence to demonstrate that
where ammunition is found weapons are often also
present and that seizures of large consignments
severely disrupt the tempo of illegal operations.  
Detection dogs are very probably the most effective
tool for finding packaged and concealed ammunition
but it is not yet possible to determine precise ranges,
or if they will detect ammunition with greater ease than
weapons.
The detection tools available for Small Arms
Ammunition are limited and whilst, in principle,
detection dogs are capable of conducting this task they
are not routinely trained in this discipline.
Progress toward the introduction of effective control
measures is hampered by a lack of comprehensive in-
formation on the current threat and existing responses.
The importance of the “Human Factor” must not be
overlooked if control measures are to remain effective.
Apart from hand-held detectors and VODS all other
technical systems require an extensive combination of
training and practice to produce competent operators.  
The introduction of cost-efficient, integrated control
measures may yet be possible but cannot be
determined until minimum detection thresholds are
established, i.e. what constitutes a “large shipment” of
weapons and ammunition.
15 Recommendations – Way Ahead
One recommended way ahead to progress introduction
of effective control measures is as follows:
 Conduct an Operational Needs Analysis to accurately
determine the level of threat, the effectiveness of
current search methodologies in partner nations and
identify changes to these tactical methodologies that
may be necessary to improve the success rate in
finding ammunition and weapons.  
 Establish suitable criteria to determine the minimum
detection thresholds at which ammunition must be
detected.
 Carry out trials to determine if suitable scent
patterns can be identified from which detection dogs
can be trained to consistently locate Small Arms
Ammunition.
 Identify the most suitable combination of resources
to consistently detect ammunition and establish if
this will also provide an integrated solution.
Annex A
(Informative)
Terms and Definitions
A.1.1
booby trap
an explosive or non-explosive device, deliberately hidden with the intent of causing casualties when an apparently harmless
object is disturbed or a normally safe act is performed45.
A.1.2
defensive search
a form of search usually conducted at static locations, where there is a regular influx of people, vehicles or cargo, such as
permanent checkpoints at national border crossings, seaports and airports.
A.1.3
detonation
the rapid conversion of explosives into gaseous products by means of a shock wave passing through the explosive46.
A.1.4
detonator
a device containing a sensitive explosive which produces a detonation wave, which is normally used to initiate other, less
sensitive, explosives47.
A.1.5
false negative 
when detection equipment fails to detect the target object or substance for which it is designed but, after subsequent
investigation, that object or substance is found to be present.
A.1.6
false positive
when equipment indicates that a target object or substance has been detected or observed but, after subsequent
investigation, that object or substance proves to be innocuous.
A.1.7
IED
(improvised explosive device)  
those devices placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating potentially destructive, damaging or lethal
chemicals, designed to destroy, disfigure or harass. They may incorporate military stores, but are normally designed from
non-military components.48
A.1.8
IMS
(ion mobility spectrometry)
A.1.9
low explosive
an explosive, which does not detonate under normal conditions of use49.
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45 NATO Allied Administrative Publications (AAP) No.6 – 2003. 
46 www.undp.org.yu/seesac Draft RMDS 02.10 - SALW Standards/ SALW definitions.
47 NATO Allied Administrative Publications (AAP) No.6 – 2003. 
48, 49 Ibid.
A.1.10
MEDDS
(MECHEM explosive and drugs detection system)
a method of capturing samples of air, which are subsequently analysed by specially trained detection dogs.  
Note: It was originally developed in South Africa, in 1985, to trace smuggled explosives and ammunition.
A.1.11
offensive search
a tactical search methodology normally conducted without warning and often instigated as a result of specific, targeted intelligence.  
A.1.12
ONA
(operational needs analysis)
A.1.13
PETN 
(pentaerythritoltetranitrate)
a high explosive used extensively in military applications50.  
A.1.14
primary explosive
an explosive, which is readily detonated by a small mechanical or electric stimulus51. 
A.1.15
primary search
a type of search based on the continuous observation of all human and vehicular traffic, for example at a border checkpoint,
during which individuals or vehicles are selected at random for closer scrutiny. 
A.1.16
propellant
an explosive used to a projectile or missile, or to do other work by the expansion of high-pressure gas produced by burning.52
A.1.17
RDX
research developed explosive 
(cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine)
a high explosive used extensively in military applications.53 
A.1.18
RPG
(rocket-propelled grenade)
A.1.19
SAA
(small arms ammunition)
A.1.20
SALW
(small arms and light weapons)
all lethal conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that also do not require a
substantial logistic and maintenance capability.54
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50 NATO Allied Administrative Publications (AAP) No.6 – 2003. 
51, 52,53 Ibid.
54 www.undp.org.yu/seesac Draft RMDS 02.10 - SALW Standards/ SALW definitions.
A.1.21
search
the application of systematic procedures and appropriate detection equipment to locate specified targets.55 
A.1.22
secondary explosive
an explosive which can be made to detonate when initiated by a detonation wave or other shock front but which does not
normally detonate when heated or ignited.56
A.1.23
secondary search
a type of search where people and vehicles can be segregated and moved to a specifically designated area where a more
intensive inspection can be conducted 
A.1.24
SEESAC
(South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons)
A.1.25
SPR
(surface penetrating radar)
A.1.26
SPSEE
(Stability Pact for South East Europe) 
A.1.27
TIPS
(threat image projection system)
a commercial software package the purpose of which is Its purpose is to monitor the x-ray operators performance level by
discretely projecting images of threats into bags being scanned by the x-ray machine, detecting the operator's response to
these threats, and recording the threat projections and operators responses in a database. 
A.1.28
TOR
(terms of reference)
A.1.29
UXO
(unexploded ordnance)
any explosive ordnance which has been primed, fuzed, armed or otherwise prepared for action and which has been fired,
dropped, launched, projected or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel or
material and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or any other cause.57
A.1.30
VODS
(vapour odour detection system)
a UK commercial variant of MEDDS.
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55 International School for Search and Explosives Engineers – Search Training Module
56 NATO Allied Administrative Publications (AAP) No.6 – 2003. 
57 Ibid.
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SEESAC
South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the
Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
The South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) is a joint
UNDP-Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe project. Launched in May 2002 and managed under the auspices of
the UNDP Country Office in Belgrade, SEESAC works to co-ordinate, facilitate and encourage efforts to combat the
proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and related munitions in the region, offering technical
expertise and support to ongoing initiatives and funding for smaller scale activities designed to complement
project undertaken by other actors. SEESAC works towards the implementation of the Stability Pact Regional
Implementation Plan on SALW in eight countries in South Eastern Europe - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Romania and Serbia & Montenegro.
